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CONTRACTING:  DISCUSSION
H. L. Goodwin, Jr.
Agricultural economists have a penchant for cor-  terprises  will  alter their business  organizations  to
paring ex ante and expost analyses of changes which  avoid imposition  of sanctions upon themselves by
impact various agricultural sectors.  This is particu-  utilizing contract labor and (2) The practice of labor
larly the case with respect to legislative  and policy  contracting will intensify with low levels of sanction
changes which undergo protracted periods of fervent  enforcement. In essence, Polopolus and Emerson are
debate. The case in point is immigration reform and  stating  the case for an increasing presence of farm
its impact upon agricultural labor. Debate proceeded  labor contractors in the agricultural labor arena. Be-
for several years preceding passage of the Immigra-  fore  examining  this assertion  relative  to entrepre-
tion Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), often  neurship,  sanctions  and  contracts,  it  is  useful  to
pitting  agribusinesses,  producers,  politicians,  and  become more familiar with the current state of agri-
farmworker  groups  against  one  another  and  fre-  cultural  labor with respect  to IRCA.  After  having
quently  having the rather  bizarre effect of creating  summarized  this situation,  discussion  will proceed
previously unheard of alliances among old rivals. It  by topical area as presented by Polopolus and Emer-
was largely through these efforts that agriculture was  son.
given  special  dispensation  to  comply  with  IRCA
provisions in varying degrees and over varying time  CURRENT STATUS  OF
frames compared to the rest of society. Pundits from  AGRICULTURAL LABOR
every group predicted the impacts of IRCA, specifi-  Congressional directives require that the Commis-
cally on agriculture.  sion  on  Agriculture  Workers  (CAW)  monitor  the
The jury is "still out" regarding the actual  effects  impacts  of IRCA  on agricultural  labor  from nine
of IRCA  on agriculture.  The  law,  which  was de-  perspectives, including supply, wages, working con-
signed to curb illegal immigration and limit employ-  ditions, and unique  needs assessments. USDA and
ment of non-qualifying alien workers, has yet to be  DOL were charged with determining whether labor
thoroughly  analyzed  in  terms  of its efficiency  in  shortages  resulted from the passage of IRCA. Two
achieving its purposes. According to a recent Asso-  separate surveys, the Quarterly  Agricultural  Labor
ciated Press Release, the flow of illegal immigrants  Survey and the National  Agricultural  Workers Sur-
into the U.S. from the Latin countries has not sub-  vey,  indicated no shortage  of labor existed.  In fact,
stantially  decreased;  in fact,  predictions for illegal  an actual  increase  occurred  in the number of Sea-
immigration apprehensions in 1990 exceeded those  sonal  Agricultural  Workers  approved  by  govern-
in previous  post-IRCA years by some ten percent.  mental  agencies  (Rural California Report).
The  widely  publicized  agricultural  labor shortage  Shortages  which were  anticipated  on a widespread
has not developed.  These occurrences  may well be  basis did not materialize  except in traditionally la-
inextricably linked. The market through which agri-  bor-short areas. As a result, USDA-DOL determined
cultural labor is recruited, hired, and distributed has  that no additional agricultural workers  were needed
adjusted to the disruptions imposed upon it through  in the U.S. and did not issue visas for Replenishment
policy alterations.  Agricultural Workers (RAWs).
Although many  varied  factors  are  currently  im-  Duffield recently completed an estimation of farm
pacting  the  agricultural  labor market,  the  primary  labor  elasticities  in  the  1984  to  1988  period  and
focus of the Polopolus and Emerson  paper was on  found  an  elastic  relationship between  demand  for
entrepreneurship,  sanctions,  and labor  contracting  hired labor and a change in real wage rates. He posits
practice and principle since the enactment of IRCA.  that if IRCA successfully restricts labor supply, real
The authors predicate  their analysis and discussion  wages may not rise significantly as employers move
on two primary hypotheses.  Paraphrased,  they are:  to labor-saving devices. It seems plausible, then, that
(1)  Entrepreneurs of labor intensive  agricultural en-  if IRCA fails to restrict labor supply, real wages will
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69at best remain the same or likely  decrease, particu-  (3)  the size of the firm and its management  objec-
larly if illegals continue  to contribute  to the  labor  tives;  and (4) the nature of a firm's particular agri-
pool. Indeed,  a temporary  labor glut may occur  in  cultural activity.
select geographic  areas as  low-skill workers move  Areas  where  hired  agricultural  labor  is in tight
in to the agricultural labor supply pool and retrain to  supply  will  understandably  see  greater  entrepre-
move out of agriculture,  simultaneous with a grow-  neurial  activity.  The decision to  pursue labor con-
ing immigrant base. Actual wages have declined in  tracting  in  such  areas  may  well  be  driven  by
California, the largest employer of hired agricultural  recruitment  or search  costs  (cost of information)
labor, by ten percent since 1980. It is suggested that  such that producers or agribusinesses  choose to de-
the decline is due to increased labor supply relative  fray these costs by "subcontracting"  to farm labor
to demand (Rural  California  Report). Such is not the  contractors (FLCs). Similarly, FLCs have the oppor-
case  nationwide,  as interim  shortages  of seasonal  tunity  to  market  their  recruitment  skills  so  as to
labor continue to occur in several areas. Apparently,  extract greater profits. To the agribusiness, the mar-
distribution and not quantity is the problematic force  ginal value product of the FLCs' recruiting exceeds
impacting  on labor.  The  Commission  on Agricul-  the opportunity cost of their own recruiting process.
tural  Workers  is presently  conducting  hearings in  Labor  surplus  areas  behave  contrariwise  to  this;
selected areas across the U.S. (Texas, California, the  entrepreneurial  activity  may  not emerge  due to  a
Midwest, the Atlantic Coast, Florida, and the Pacific  lower opportunity cost of worker recruitment by the
Northwest) for the purpose of providing input to the  firm and/or a lower marginal value product of the
Congress in altering IRCA if needed.  recruitment function by FLCs.
Firm behavior will also differ based upon the resi-
ENTREPRENEURSHIP  dence status of the workforce.  FLCs play a greater
In light of the lack of labor shortages,  Polopolus  role in areas lacking an indigenous or resident labor
and Emerson assume that the entrepreneurial  spirit  supply.  A  primary  reason  follows  the  logic  of
of agribusiness  has  adjusted  to  policy  changes  Polopolus  and  Emerson  in  that  the  value  of the
brought by IRCA. The primary consideration is their  recruitment function is greater when the labor pool
motivation  for  profit and  their  desire  to  shift the  is transient in nature and/or employed for short pe-
responsibility for routine, repetitive farm labor tasks  riods  of  time.  The  proportion  of labor  hired  for
to someone outside the agribusiness  firm. Two ex-  intensive activities should  increase in the Midwest,
treme  possibilities  are  proposed-that  firms  may  the Pacific Northwest, and the Northeast because the
vertically  integrate  to include  all activities  of pro-  workers are primarily migrant in nature. California
duction  or that  separate  firms  will  exist  for  each  may exhibit similar tendencies.
activity of production.  In reality most firms operate  Both the  size  of the firm  and the nature  of the
somewhere in between these two extremes.  Deter-  agricultural  activity  effect  the  use  of  FLCs.
minants  as  to  which  course  is  taken  include  the  Polopolus and Emerson  point out that larger firms
transaction costs of recruitment and employment of  may use FLCs less than smaller ones due to the larger
labor and the principle agent status of the employer.  firms' ability to lower the costs of recruitment. How-
Polopolus and Emerson point out that larger firms  ever,there are numerous reasons for the considerable
have a greater opportunity to spread the information  use of FLCs by large firms; among these reasons are
costs associated with hiring workers and, therefore,  risks of sanction enforcement and a shift in costs for
may not choose  to utilize labor contractors.  Small  various worker benefits mandated by state and fed-
firms will likely choose  an opposing  course of ac-  eral regulations. Type of agricultural activity and the
tion.  nature of the  commodity  must also  be considered
These observations  are, to a large degree, accurate  when assessing the occurrence  and nature of entre-
representations  of what actually  occurs.  However,  preneurial  activity in agriculture.  FLCs  are antici-
certain divergences from this general pattern are not  pated to be more widely used in those labor-intensive
uncommon. Indeed, the tendency to over-simplify or  agricultural  activities  classified  as  "perishable" by
over-generalize  such entrepreneurial  activity  as de-  IRCA  (horticultural  specialties,  fruits  and  vegeta-
scribed must be carefully guarded against.  The ex-  bles, grains).  Counter  to  this,  individual agribusi-
tent  to  which  agribusinesses  participate  in  nesses are likely to take up entrepreneurial activities
entrepreneurship  to address  their agricultural  labor  in  "non-perishable"  activities  such  as  livestock,
decisions will likely rest on several primary factors,  dairy, poultry, and forestry.
including, but not limited to: (1) whether the area is  Certainly  entrepreneurial  behavior is not the sole
in  a labor deficit  or labor surplus  situation;  (2) to  property  of agribusinessmen;  FLCs are seizing op-
what degree the labor force  is migrant or resident;  portunities to provide their services.  As mentioned
70Tablel 1. Employing  Units and  Numbers of  Employees,  Field, Harvest and  Packing Labor in Texas
Agriculture, by Quarter,  1986 and  1989*
Farm Labor  Fruit and  All Texas
Quarter  Contractors  Veg.  Firms  Agriculture
Units  Employees  Units  Employees  Units  Employees
1/86  181  3647  448  15279  4330  49919
1/89  366  7924  528  17592  6736  61107
2/86  196  5141  471  15537  4831  53559
2/89  360  10554  541  20301  6769  68278
3/86  213  2662  480  11234  5157  50900
3/89  362  3939  553  11214  6875  58000
4/86  227  3496  485  14786  5284  53506
4/89  376  5601  548  15879  7093  64092
*Reporting  units and numbers of employees are for those covered by unemployment  insurance. Select sectors of
agriculture shown.
Source:  Texas Employment Commission.  Undisclosed data.
in the cited case study in Florida citrus, certain of the  port is contributed by data from California regarding
FLCs  are  increasing  the scope and nature of their  the rise of FLCs inthe period 1984-1988 (Martinand
services  beyond  recruitment  to  include  hauling,  Miller). In general, the percentage of labor and pay-
packing,  and  delivery  of products  to  packers  and  roll  attributable  to  FLCs  has  increased,  although
processors.  However,  the  information  function  is  variations have occurred with respect to geographic
still  their  primary  opportunity  for  exploitation.  and crop activity distribution. They find evidence of
Knowledge  of  availability,  location  and  skills  of  a two-tiered farm labor market, where direct hiring
potential workers, as well as the command of culture  is being concentrated  on fewer and larger farms, and
and language, positions progressive and enterprising  FLCs  hirings  are  more  frequent  and  more  frag-
FLCs advantageously.  mented among small and medium-size operations.
That FLCs are increasing in frequency and impor-
tance in Texas agriculture  is indicated by examina-
tion of Texas Employment Commission data for the
years 1986-1989.  These data, taken from the report-  Polopolus and Emerson maintain that the presence
ing units of unemployment insurance records, span  of employer sanctions acts as a sufficient source of
the  period  from  before  IRCA to  beyond  the  last  risk to decreasing profit such that agribusinesses will
extension of agricultural compliance to IRCA. Quar-  alter their structures to increase the use of FLCs. In
terly data indicate that the increase in both reporting  this view, the FLC assumes the risk associated with
units and in number of employees accounted  for by  employment of illegal workers.  An alternate propo-
FLCs exceeds increases by fruit and vegetable firms  sition is the evolution of separable firms to handle
and agriculture as a whole (Table 1). Importantly, the  the labor function.  Lax  enforcement  of employer
number  of agricultural  employees  hired  by FLCs  sanctions should lead to even greater use of FLCs.
increased 48 percent in the third quarter from 1986-  The potential effectiveness  of sanctions rests with
1989, compared with no increase in fruit and vege-  the threat  of enforcement  which will  carry  costly
table  firm  hirings,  and  a  14  percent  increase  in  penalties  for  each  illegal  worker  identified.  In an
agriculture  as a whole.  First quarter increases were  economic sense, the risk of enforcement has a mone-
much larger (117 percent for FLCs vs. 15 percent and  tary value attached  at each probability level  antici-
22 percent, respectively, for fruit and vegetable firms  pated. The reality of enforcement has been less than
and  all agricultural firms,  Table 2).  Relative shares  threatening, however, as anticipated in a 1987 Dallas
of laborers in agriculture  have increased to  13 and  Federal  Reserve Bank publication.  Hill and Pearce
15 percent  in the first and second  quarters of  1989  estimated  the concentration  of illegals within agri-
(up from 7 and 10 percent in 1986). The percentage  culture  and non-agricultural  industries.  They  hy-
for  fruit  and  vegetable  firms  has  remained  at  29  pothesized  that sanction enforcement in agriculture
percent  for  both  quarters  across  this  time  period  would indeed be small due to the concentration of
(Table 3).  illegal immigrants in certain industries, such as tex-
Such results lend strong support for the hypotheses  tiles and apparels, leather and footwear, certain food
posed by Polopolus and Emerson.  Additional  sup-  manufacturers, and miscellaneous light manufactur-
71Tablel 2. Percentage Change in Employing Units and  Numbers of Employees,  Field, Harvest and Packing
Labor in Texas Agriculture, by Quarter,  1986 to 1989*
Farm  Labor  Fruit and  All Texas
Quarter  Contractors  Veg. Firms  Agriculture
Units  Employees  Units  Employees  Units  Employees
1  +102.2  +117.3  +17.8  +15.1  +55.6  +22.4
2  +83.7  +105.3  +14.9  +30.7  +40.1  +27.5
3  +70.0  +48.0  +15.2  0  +33.3  +13.9
4  +65.6  +60.2  +13.0  +7.4  +34.2  +19.8
*Reporting  units and numbers of employees are for those covered by unemployment insurance. Select sectors of
agriculture shown.
Source: Texas  Employment Commission. Undisclosed data.
ing. Additionally,  select geographic areas with high
concentrations  of illegals  are  likely  to be  targeted  pronounced on a selective basis. Today, only 12,400
due to lack of INS personnel for apprehension and  workers are covered by unions in California, a sharp
prosecution.  decrease from the early  1980s (Martin and Abele).
It appears as though the threat of effective enforce-  No significant activity is present in Texas; in fact,
ment is less potent than one might anticipate,  par-  not  one job  as of January,  1991,  was  covered by
ticularly  for  employers  of  large  numbers  of  union contract  in Texas,  according  to recent testi-
low-skilled  agricultural  laborers.  Large  firms may  mony at the Commission  oAgricultural Workers
well feel more compulsion to comply with laws and  hearings in Weslaco, Texas. Union activity, vis-a-vis
regulations  based  upon  experience  in  other  non-  large, vertically-integrated  companies, continues to
sanction-related areas such as wage and hour stand-  be  strong  in  areas  geographically  distant  from  a
ards,  workmen's  compensation,  unemployment  plentiful  low-skilled  labor  supply.  The  Midwest
insurance, and workplace  safety requirements.  Un-  vegetable  industry is a prime example. Union activ-
derstandably  then,  the  California  experience  of  ity will likely increase in areas distant from adequate
FLCs being used  primarily by small and  medium-  labor supply and decrease in areas of adequate labor
sized  firms  has  evolved.  Regardless  of the lower  supply.  This will particularly be the case in face of
actual level of risk involved and the potential lower-  the  apparent  inability  of  sanction  enforcement  to
ing of employers' profits due to sanctions, it remains  t illegal labor in agriculture  and the increase in
true that the cost of hiring agricultural  workers has
increased since IRCA was enacted in  1986.  Table 3.  Percentage of All Texas Agricultural
What effect,  if any, have  sanctions had upon the  Employers,  Field, Harvest,  and  Packing,
presence and growth of farm labor unions? If sanc-  Employed  by Farm Labor Contractors
and  Fruit and Vegetable  Firms, by
tions  were  effective  in  controlling  use  of  illegal  Quarter 1  and  Vegeta
labor,  one might  argue that  supply had  contracted  Qu  r  16  ad 
and a greater opportunity for organization and nego-  Farm  Labor  Fruit and
tiation would be present. A recent article by Mancur  Quarter  Contractors  Vegetable  Firms
Olson lends support to this conclusion, citing collec-  1/86  7.3  30.6
tive action and exploitation in agriculture  and rural  1/89  13.0  28.8
economies which often result from constricted sup-  2/86  9.6  29.0
ply.  Alternatively,  it  could  be  argued  that  fewer  2/89  15.4  29.7
workers would mean increased  competition among
employers, leading to higher wages and better bene-  3/86  .
fits. In practice,  FLCs have long been used in Cali-  3/89  6.8  19.3
fornia as  a method  of circumventing  unions.  The  4/86  6.5  27.6
importance of union activity is lessening in agricul-  4/89  8.7  24.8
ture overall, but effects are being felt in select, con-  *Reporting  units and  numbers of employees for those
centrated industries, for example, the mushroom and  covered  by unemployment insurance.  Select sectors of
dairy industries,  and  in certain geographic  regions  agriculture shown.
(Rural California  Report). Wage premiums still ex-  Source:  Texas Employment Commission.  Undisclosed
ist for traditional areas of union activity, but are more  data.
72available legalized labor which resulted from IRCA  sive production.  While IRCA seems to have had an
implementation.  encouraging  effect on these trends, it has not been
LABOR CONTRACTING  the major driver  of them.  More pertinent  in their LABOR CONTRACTING
development  has been  the desire to lower costs of
Farm labor contractors are largely involved in the  recruitment and overhead by transferring responsi-
recruitment of labor and the coordination  of labor  bities to  . The supply neither of legal nor of
bilities to FLCs.  The supply neither  of legal nor of
supply and demand. FLCs pose comparative advan-  illegal laborers appears to have diminished, suggest- illegal laborers appears to have diminished, suggest-
tages with such low-skilled, repetitive task laborers.  ,  ,  ,  .i  . .i  .'  .-T  ....... ~  ming that min  agriculture,  at least, there has been little The Florida case study reveals that certain FLCs are
extracting  higher labor payments based upon extra  significant  overall  change  in availability of labor. extracting higher labor payments based  upon extra
services  provided,  such as harvest  hauling.  Study  Large-scale movement out of the legal labor pool by
results  indicate that all FLCs provide the requisite  SAW workers to non-agricultural jobs has not been
fringe benefits.  Many employers of FLCs appear to  evident, due, most probably, to the low educational
be transferring management  and overhead  costs of  level of many recent immigrants.
fringe benefits by including these items in the labor  Hired agricultural  labor is viewed by  many  as a
contracts. It is, in effect, a method of cutting costs on  pawn in  the economic  system.  While wages  and
both, recruitment and overhead. Additionally, liabil- 
* . „,  *J  ,r  *  r  . . •S  _,  r  benefits  are improving for farm laborers, the  com- ity for violation of laws and regulations is transferred
parative  quality of life remains lower for them than to FLCs. Thus, this practice is gaining  widespread  parative quality of life remains lower for them than
adoption,  particularly  in  California,  Florida,  and  for  participants  in  many  other  labor market  seg-
Texas.  ments. It is interesting  to observe that while provi-
Counter  to  this  trend,  some  large  employers  in  sion  was  made  to  ensure  adequate  labor  for
Texas  are  choosing  to hire  so-called  "company  agriculture  through  SAW  and  RAW  workers,  no
crews"  so that all control for compliance rests with  provision for retraining or educational upgrading of
the firm. Shippers  and packers responsible for har-  these  workers  was  included  in  IRCA  or  in  sub-
vesting  fall  in  this  category.  The  reason  for  this  sequent legislation or regulatory rulings.
apparently  contradictory logic lies in what employ-
ers believe to be inconsistent determination of finan-  Farm  labor contractors must continue to offer an
cial  liability  in  court  cases,  dependent  upon  the  economic advantage if they are to flourish in the long
specific  regulatory  agent  involved.  If the firm  is  term. Agribusinesses and FLCs will continue to util-
indeed  held ultimately  liable for violation, regard-  ize entrepreneurial  behavior to cut costs and main-
less of FLC contracts,  then these same firms reason  tain  a  competitive  position  for  agriculture  to  the
that they should be in charge of all facets of regula-  extent it is possible. It is unclear what recommenda-
tory  compliance.  Until such  inconsistency  is recti-  tios CA  will make to Congress for revision and
fled, there is likely to be a bi-modal pattern of FLC  u  g  o  t  a  p  i  updating  of  the  agricultural  provisions  min  IRCA. use, particularly min  Texas.
What is clear, is that for agribusiness producers and
CONCLUDING REMARKS  farm labor contractors,  the changing economic and
Trends in the use of farm labor contractors seem to  regulatory environment will continue to provide en-
be toward greater use of FLCs, especially for small  trepreneurial  opportunities for progressive persons
or middle-sized agricultural operators in labor-inten-  choosing to capitalize on them.
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